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PERSONS*
Katherine Shaw Spaht**
ESTABLISHING THE FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
In last year's symposium,1 the provisions of Act 549 of 1980
which amended Civil Code articles 208 and 209 were analyzed. An-
ticipating the possibility of constitutionally mandated3 modifications
* The subject of rehabilitative alimony will be discussed in a forum juridicum to
appear in this volume of the LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW in a subsequent issue.
** Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Persons, 41 LA. L. REV. 380,
380-88 (1981).
2. LA. CiV. CODE art. 208 (as it appeared prior to 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § 1): Il-
legitimate children, who have not been acknowledged as provided in Article 203, may
be allowed to prove their filiation. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209 (1980) (as it appeared prior
to 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § 1):
(1) An illegitimate child may be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of filia-
tion under the provisions of this article. Or any child may establish filiation,
regardless of the circumstances of conception, by a civil proceeding instituted by
the child or on his behalf in the parish of his birth, or other proper venue as pro-
vided by law, within the time limitation prescribed in this article.
(2) A child who is shown to be the child of a woman on an original certificate
of birth is presumed to be the child of that woman, though the contrary may be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
(3) An illegitimate child not shown as the child of a woman on an original cert-
ificate of birth may prove filiation by any means which establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, including acknowledgment in a testament, that he
is the illegitimate child of that woman.
(4) A child of a man may prove filiation by any means which establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, including acknowledgment in a testament, that he
is the child of that man. Evidence that the mother and alleged father were known
as living in a state of concubinage and resided as such at the time when the child
was conceived creates a rebuttable presumption of filiation between the child and
the alleged father.
(5) Proof of filiation must be made by evidence of events, conduct, or other in-
formation which occurred during the lifetime of the alleged parent. A civil pro-
ceeding to establish filiation must be brought within six months after the death of
the alleged parent, or within nineteen years of the illegitimate child's birth,
whichever occurs first. If an illegitimate child is born posthumously, a civil pro-
ceeding to establish filiation must be instituted within six months of its birth,
unless there is a presumption of filiation as set forth in Paragraph 2 above. If no
proceeding is timely instituted, the claim of an illegitimate child or on its behalf
to rights in the succession of the alleged parent shall forever be barred. The time
limitation provided in this article shall run against all persons, including minors
and interdicts.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. See the Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
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of Louisiana successions law,' the Legislature passed Act 549 to
establish a procedure for proving the filiation of an illegitimate child
neither formally acknowledged 5 nor legitimated' by the alleged
parent. The Civil Code articles as amended did create problems in
interpretation and application, which were considered in last year's
symposium article
During the 1981 legislative session, a bill was introduced on
recommendation of the Louisiana Law Institute to amend Civil Code
articles 208 and 209 again.8 Act 720 eliminates many of the problems
4. 1981 La. Acts, No. 919. In Smith v. Stephens, 401 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1981), the plaintiff instituted suit against the legitimate heirs of James Edward
Stephens, who died in 1959, and other defendants, seeking recognition as a surviving
child (illegitimate) and irregular heir. The trial court sustained a dilatory exception of
prematurity based upon the plaintiff's failure to first obtain a judgment recognizing
her as an irregular heir and placing her in possession of the Stephens' succession. The
court of appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court. According to the majority,
"the plaintiff has the right of action in which she may seek to have herself declared an
irregular heir of the descendant . . . . [And] (als part of such an action she may allege
her paternity and the acknowledgment of the relationship and offer evidence to prove
those allegations." Id. at 678. According to Judge Culpepper, in a concurring opinion,
"[tlhe requirement of a prior court order or judgment recognizing an illegitimate heir
[who has no seizin] appears to be very similar to the 'filiation order' held to be a per-
missible state statute requirement in Lalli v. Latl, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S. Ct. 518, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 503." Id. at 679 (Culpepper, J., concurring).
Neither the majority opinion nor the concurring opinion cite Civil Code articles
208 and 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, effective July 23, 1980. The plain-
tiff, who did not allege formal acknowledgment under Civil Code. article 203 or
legitimation under Civil Code articles 198 and 200, would be governed by the provi-
sions of section 4 of Act 549.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 203: "The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child shall be
made by a declaration executed before a notary public, in the presence of two
witnesses, 6~y the father and mother or either of them, or it may be made in the
registering of the birth or baptism of such child."
6. LA. Civ. CODE art. 198: "Illegitimate children are legitimated by the subse-
quent marriage of their father and mother, whenever the latter have formally or infor-
mally acknowledged them as their children, either before or after the marriage."
LA. CrV. CODE art. 200:
A father or mother shall have the power to legitimate his or her illegitimate
children by an act passed before a notary public and two witnesses, declaring that
it is the intention of the parent making the declaration to legitimate such child or
children; provided, there exists at the time of conception or at the time of
legitimation of such children no legal impediment to the marriage of the father or
mother. Nor can a parent legitimate his or her illegitimate offspring in the man-
ner prescribed in this article, when there exists on the part of such parent any
legitimate descendant at the time of legitimation.
Furthermore, the comments to article 209, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § 1,
indicate that adopted children are legitimately filiated by the adoption proceeding
itself and need not comply with this article. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 214.
7. See note 1, supra.
8. La. H.B. 818, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
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in statutory construction raised by the provisions of its predecessor,
Act 549 of 1980. First, Act 720 does not distinguish between il-
legitimate children who "may be entitled to a rebuttable presump-
tion of filiation"9 and those who must establish filiation "by a civil
proceeding instituted by the child on his behalf ... within the time
limitation prescribed in this article."'" Thus, the dichotomy between
illegitimate children who were required to institute a timely pro-
ceeding to establish filiation and those who were not" was
eliminated. Under Act 720, "a child who does not enjoy legitimate
filiation or who has not been filiated by the initiative of the parent
by legitimation or by acknowledgment under article 203 must in-
itiate a proceeding under article 209."'2
Furthermore, the language of article 208 is more precise than its
predecessor 3 in establishing which illegitimate children must in-
stitute the proceeding to establish filiation. Act 549 of 1980 specified
that illegitimate children who had not been formally acknowledged
regardless of the circumstances of conception' were required to in-
stitute a proceeding to establish filiation. Article 208, as amended by
Act 720 of 1981, specifies that a child who enjoys legitimate filiation
by application of the presumption of article 184,11 or a child who has
been legitimated" or formally acknowledged" by the parent need
not institute the proceeding. In all of the foregoing instances, suffi-
cient proof of the parent-child link is available. Furthermore, article
209, as amended by Act 720,18 implies that the child who enjoys
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1. The
statutory language of Act 549 of 1980 concerning the rebuttable presumption of pater-
nity has been eliminated from. Civil Code article 209, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No.
720. However, reference to the circumstances which created the presumption is made
in comment (b) to article 209: "Proof of filiation may include. but is not limited to: 'In-
formal' acknowledgment; scientific test results; acknowledgment in a testament; and
proof that the alleged parents lived in a state of concubinage at the time of concep-
tion .... " (Emphasis added).
10. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § 1.
11. See discussions in Spaht, supra note 1, at 383-84.
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 208, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § 1.
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 208, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, .No. 549, § 1: "Il-
legitimate children who have not been acknowledged as provided in article 203. may be
allowed to prove their filiation."
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1.
15. LA. Civ. CODE. art. 184: "The husband of the mother is presumed to be the
father of all children born or conceived during the marriage."
16. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 198 & 200.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 203.
18.- LA. Civ. CODE art. 209(A, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 720. § 1:
A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the
parent by legitimation or by acknowledgment under Article 203 must prove filia-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding instituted by the
child or on his behalf within the time limit provided in this article ....
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legitimate filiation, or is legitimated or formally acknowledged, can-
not institute the proceeding to establish filiation. Such an inter-
pretation is perfectly consistent with the organization of the Civil
Code articles regarding proof of the parent-child relationship,"9 but
inconsistent with the implications of some of the jurisprudence."0 A
further indication that such an interpretation is correct is the
amendment to the Child Support Enforcement Program.3 The provi-
sions which authorize the Department of Health and Human
Resources to institute filiation proceedings suggest that article 209
prohibits a child from instituting the civil proceeding to establish
filiation if he enjoys legitimate status: "The department ... may ...
take direct civil action, including actions to establish filiation against
an alleged biological parent notwithstanding the existence of a legal
presumption that another person is the parent of the child solely for
the purpose of fulfilling its responsibility under this Section."'
19. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 178-209. The structure of these.Civil Code articles was
the subject of a recent article, Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged:
Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59
(1976).
20. In particular, the court in Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974), held
that for purposes of a wrongful death action instituted under Civil Code article 2315, a
child may be the presumed legitimate child of the husband of the mother, LA. Civ.
CODE art. 184, and the biological child of another man.
In Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975), the supreme court held that
children, presumed to be legitimate issue of the husband of the mother, could be
legitimated under Civil Code article 198 by the subsequent marriage of their mother to
the biological father. The rationale of the Louisiana Supreme Court depended upon the
statutory construction of article 198 and cannot be cited as authority for the general
proposition that a child may possess a "dual status." Furthermore, the holding in Suc-
cession of Mitchell is unaffected by the statutory language of article 209, as amended
by Act 720, because as to the bioilogical father of the child legitimated under Civil
Code article 198, the civil proceeding to establish filiation need not be instituted.
Nothing in the statutory language of article 209, as amended by Act 720, can be con-
strued as necessarily overruling Succession of Mitchell. See a discussion of these cases
in Spaht & Shaw, supra note 19.
21. LA. R.S. 46:236.1(F (Supp. 1975, 1976 & 1978) as amended by 1981 La. Acts,
No. 720, § 3:
The department, except when it is not in the best interest of the child, may,
without the necessity of written assignment, subrogation, tutorship proceedings,
separation proceedings, or divorce proceedings, take direct civil action, including
actions to establish paternity, in any court of competent civil jurisdiction to obtain
child support from the person primarily legally responsible for the support of a
minor child who is receiving aid to families with dependent children when that
person has failed to support such child. The amount of such child support shall be
set only by order of a court of competent jurisdiction or by the consent of the par-
ties. A separate and distinct cause of action in favor of the department is hereby
created, and suits brought under this provision need not be ancillary to or depen-
dent upon any other legal proceeding.
22. ld. (emphasis added).
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Reading the two statutory changes" made in Act 720, the discerni-
ble legislative intent is that a child presumed to be that of the hus-
band of the mother may not institute a proceeding to establish filia-
tion to another man.2'
Another alteration of Act 549 was the time period after the
death of the alleged parent within which a child must institute the
proceeding to establish filiation. Under Act 549, the child had to in-
stitute the civil proceeding within six months of the death of the
alleged parent or nineteen years from the child's birth, whichever
first occurs." By the provisions of Act 720, a child is accorded one
year after the death of the alleged parent or within nineteen years
of the child's birth, whichever first occurs, to institute the pro-
ceeding." Furthermore, in the paragraph containing the time limita-
tion imposed on the institution of the action to establish paternity,
the statute provides that "[ilf the proceeding is not timely in-
stituted, the child may not thereafter establish his filiation.'" The
language is sufficiently broad to apply to establishing filiation for
purposes other than successions law-such as a wrongful death ac-
tion" and an action for alimony." By comparing the corresponding
statutory language in Act 549,N the predecessor of Act 720, the con-
23. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 208 & 209, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § 1: LA.
R.S. 46:236.1(F) (Supp. 1975, 1976, & 1978), as amended by La. Acts, No. 720, § 3.
24. An argument could be made that the proper interpretation of "a child who en-
joys legitimate filiation" means a child who is presumed to be the legitimate child of
the father to whom the child is now seeking to establish filiation. The language "who
has been legitimated or acknowledged" under article 203 is qualified by the words: "by
the parent." The result of accepting such an argument is, if the presumed father, the
husband of the mother under Civil Code article 184, is a different person from the
alleged father to whom the child seeks to establish filiation, the suit is not prohibited
under the language of articles 208 and 209.
25. LA. Civ. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1.
26. LA. CiV. CODE art. 209(B), as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1: "The
proceeding required by this article must be brought within one year of the death of
the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the child's birth, whichever first occurs...."
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209(B), as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1 further
provides: "If the proceeding is not timely instituted, the child may not thereafter
establish his filiation."
28. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2315.
29. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 227, 229-234 & 240-243.
30. LA. CIv. CODE art. 209(5), as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1: "If no
proceeding is timely instituted, the claim of an illegitimate child or on its behalf to
rights in the succession of the alleged parent shall forever be barred." (Emphasis
added).
Note that Civil Code article 891, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 919, § 1, im-
poses upon alleged parents seeking to inherit the property of their children. the follow-
ing burden of proof: "A parent for the purposes of this and the following article, in-
cludes one who is legitimately filiated to the deceased or who is filiated by legitimation
or by acknowledgment under article 203 or by judgment under article 209 or who has
1982]
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clusion may be reached that Louisiana Civil Code articles 208 and.
209 apply generally to determine the proof required to establish the
parent-child relationship of an unacknowledged illegitimate.
Section 4 of Act 549 of 1980 provided that "[any illegitimate
child nineteen years of age or older shall have one year from the ef-
fective date of this Act to bring a civil proceeding to establish filia-
tion under the provisions of this Act and if no such proceeding is in-
stituted within such time, the claim of such an illegitimate shall be
forever barred." The effective date of Act 549 was July 23, 1980,
upon signature of the Governor.3' Under Act 549, an illegitimate
child who had been formally acknowledged, "or possibly who is en-
titled to a rebuttable presumption of filiation ..." was not affected
by the expiration of the statutory period. However, other informally
acknowledged illegitimate children were subject to the peremptive
period" for instituting a civil proceeding, which expired July 23,
1981.
Under Section 2 of Act 720,' "any person against whom the time
period in this Act would otherwise have accrued except for the pro-
visions of this Section shall have one year from its effective date to
bring a proceeding to establish filiation of a child." The effective
openly and notoriously treated the child as his own and has not refused to support
him." (Emphasis added). The italicized language of article 891 was borrowed from
recommendations of the Law Revision Commission of New York discussed in Note, II-
legitimates' Intestate Succession Rights in New York: Is Further Liberalization For-
thcoming?. 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 390 (1980). It is similar to a provision of the
Uniform Probate Code § 2-109(2)(ii) (1969 version) which was intended to reduce the
possibility of fraudulent claims against an illegitimate's estate.
31. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 3.
32. Spaht, supra note 1, at 387.
33. There is authority for the proposition that section 3 of Act 549 of 1980 was a
period of peremption, rather than prescription. By use of the language "shall forever
be barred," the time limit of one year from the effective date of the Act became a part
of the right, which was extinguished on July 23, 1981. See the following Louisiana deci-
sions in which statutes containing the language "forever barred" were interpreted as
peremptive: Buster v. Wray Dickinson Co., 183 La. 562, 164 So. 2d 415 (1935); Ancor v.
Belden Concrete Prods. Co., 260 La. 372, 256 So. 2d 122 (1971); Harris v. Trader's &
Gen. Ins. Co., 4 So. 2d 24 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1941). See generally Comment, Legal
Rights and the Passage of Time, 41 LA. L. REV. 220 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court uses a different approach in distinguishing a
period of prescription from that of peremption. Under the Supreme Court analysis a
time limit that appears in the same statute that creates the substantive right or in
another statute that is closely related to the right becomes a part of the substantive
right. See, e.g., Chase Sec. Co. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1944); Danzer & Co. v. Gulf
& Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (1924); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1903); Camp-
bell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1855). The time limit of section 3 of Act 549 of 1980 would
also be considered by the United States Supreme Court as a period of peremption.
34. 1981 La. Acts, No. 720, § 2 (emphasis added).
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date of Act 720 was September 11, 1981. Thus, unacknowledged il-
legitimate children whose right to institute an action to establish
filiation expired on July 23, 1981, were by section 2 of Act 720
granted an additional year (from September 12, 1981 to September
12, 1982) in which to institute the proceeding to establish filiation.
The purpose of the section was to cure defects in section 4 of Act
549, which had terminated the right to establish filiation of an il-
legitimate child under nineteen years of age whose alleged parent
had died more than six months before July 23, 1980. The question
raised by section 2 of Act 720 is whether an heir is vested with a
substantive right to raise the expiration of the period of peremption
as a defense against an inheritance claim by the illegitimate. If so,
the legislature by extending the time period for instituting a filia-
tion proceeding may not divest the heir of this "vested" right
without due process of law.35
The threshold question concerns the nature of the "right" to
establish filiation. It is essentially procedural, or evidentiary-the
first and second steps in a three-step process"6 which ultimately
determines a child's classification and consequently his substantive
rights."7 Classification is made under Civil Code as follows: (1) iden-
tify the mother; (2) identify the father; (3) determine the date of
birth or conception. If the date of conception or birth falls within the
marriage of the father and mother, then the child is legitimate. Filia-
tion is the act of fixing paternity or maternity. Classification is the
process of arranging pesons in either the class of legitimate children
or the class of illegitimate children. Identifying father and mother
are only two steps in the codal method for classification of children.
Filiation is precedent to and has an effect on classification. However,
the distinction between filiation and classification has been ob-
fuscated.
In Pounds v. Schori6 amendments to the Civil Code articles on
disavowal of paternity39 were considered by the Louisiana Supreme
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
36. "Classification is made according to a three-step method prescribed by the
Civil Code: (1) identify the mother, (2) identify the father, (3) determine the date of con-
ception .. " Spaht & Shaw, supra note 19, at 63. "Consequently, filiation's main con-
cern is with proof: what sort of evidence is required to prove the identity of the father
to the satisfaction of the trier of fact." Id. at 64.
37. The purpose of classification is to provide a vehicle for regulation of the
parent-child relationship, that is. for identifying the rights and obligations which
parents incur by the birth of their children .... It may be said then, that the im-
portance of classification derives from its effects, that is, the legal consequence
which the legislator chooses to attach to status.
Id. at 62.
38. 377 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1979).
39. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 184-190, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 430, § 1.
1982]
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Court as "affecting substantive rights."'" The status of a child born
during marriage and entitled to "the presumption of legitimacy, is a
matter of substance of the utmost importance considering it in-
volves not only legitimacy but the right of inheritance.""1 Thus, the
articles on disavowal, which regulate the proof of legitimate filia-
tion, were considered substantive rather than procedural because of
their ultimate classificatory function. The right to eftablish filiation
under article 208 and 209 of Act 549, within the accompanying
peremptive period, by analogy was a substantive right of the il-
legitimate child. The characterization of the illegitimate's right to
establish filiation as substantive, rather than procedural, under the
jurisprudence is crucial for purposes of further analysis.' Yet, even
if one concludes that the right is substantive, it does not necessarily
follow that an heir by the extinction of the illegitimate's right has
acquired a substantive right to inherit property.
Might an heir argue that as a result of the loss of the "substan-
tive" right of the illegitimate child by expiration of the peremptive
period on July 23, 1981, the heir has acquired a "vested right"-a
right of enjoyment, present or prospective that now has become his
property absolutely and independent of any contingency? No Loui-
siana cases directly address the legal issue presented by section 2 of
Act 720.' However, in two United States Supreme Court decisions"
the Court held that a time period considered part of a "substantive"
right cannot be extended as to claims that are already barred
without violating the defendant's due process right. In Danzer & Co.
v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co.'" an amendment to the Federal
Transportation Act made after the cause of action arose, which
would have extended the period of time. within which the plaintiff
could file suit to recover damages, was held inapplicable. The
40. 377 So. 2d at 1198.
41. Id.
42. The two United States Supreme Court cases which are discussed in the text
at notes 44-48, infra, involve time periods characterized as peremptive attached to
substantive rights.
43. In Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 65 So. 2d 783 (1953), a child alleged
legitimate status on the basis of a defective act of adoption, rendered valid by the ex-
piration of a six-month period provided in a statute of repose. According to the court
the expiration of the peremptive time period cured any defect in the adoption;
therefore, the second wife of the decedent adoptive father had no right to object to the
adoption. No mention was made in the opinion of the divestiture of any vested rights
of the second wife. (who at the expiration of the time period was not even married to
the decedent), nor the rights of the second wife that may have been affected in a
subsequent suit made possible by the recognition of the adopted child's status.
44. William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (1925);
Davis v. Mills. 194 U.S. 450 (1903).
45. 268 U.S. 633 (1924).
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Supreme Court held that the lapse of time not only barred the
remedy but destroyed the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff. '
The question certified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to the
United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Mills"? was whether the
defendant in an action created by Montana law could raise the
defense of the time limitation prescribed for the action when the ac-
tion is brought in the court of another state. The Supreme Court
answered the inquiry affirmatively. 8 The rationale was that the
time period was identified specifically with the right, and therefore
became a part of the substantive right wherever applied.
Explaining the two cases of Danzer and Davis, the Supreme
Court in Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson" opined, "where the
statute in creating the liability also put a period to its existence, a
retroactive extension of the period after its expiration amounted to
a taking of property without due process."' The Supreme Court
made specific reference to Danzer and Davis and in endorsing the
rationale stated: "The abstract logic of a distinction between
substantive rights and remedial or procedural rights may not be
clear cut but it has been found to be a workable concept to point up
the real and valid differences between rules in which the stability is
of prime importance and those where flexibility is a more important
value."'"
The possibility of distinguishing Danzer and Davis does exist.
Arguably, the heirs who on July 24, 1981, were secure from in-
heritance claims of unacknowledged illegitimates, were not liable to
the plaintiffs, in all cases, such that their liability was also
destroyed. Their eventual right to inherit all the property of the
deceased is affected, since prior to extinction of the right to
establish filiation the illegitimate upon adequate proof would be en-
46. Id. at 637:
[Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885)] belonged to the class where statutory pro-
visions fixing the time within which suits must be brought to enforce an existing
cause of action are held to apply to the remedy only. But such provisions [time
periods] sometimes constitute a part of the definition of the cause of action
created by the same or another provision, and operate as limitation upon liability
This case belongs to the latter class. Section 206(f) will not be construed
retroactively to create liability. To give it that effect would be to deprive defen-
dant of its property without due process of law in contravention of the Fifth
Amendment.
47. 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
48. ld. at 457.
49. 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
50. Id. at 315 n.8.
51. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
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titled to claim a portion, if not all, 2 of the deceased's property. On the
other hand, if the heirs have been sent into possession of the succes-
sion property and have disposed of it, with or without an ad-
ministration, they may be liable to the illegitimate who has
established his filiation.' The heirs probably must account to the il-
legitimate child for his proportionate share of the deceased's proper-
ty or its value.
Another qualification of the "abstract logic" which would protect
the defendant's "vested" right to raise the peremptive period of Act
549 as a defense is referred to in the Chase Securities Corporation
case-that is, a hardship situation. Whether the plight of an il-
legitimate, who failed to file a timely suit to establish filiation, will
be considered a hardship case is difficult to answer. On one hand,
how the title to property devolves at death is an area of the law in
which "stability is of prime importance."' 4 Yet, on the other hand,
the illegitimate child affected by section 4 of Act 54955 did not have
the possibility of inheriting as a legitimate child until September 3,
1980." The illegitimate child, thereafter, had less than one year
within which to file the action to establish filiation and, if successful,
the possibility of inheriting property of the deceased parent. Of
course, the purpose of the legislature in enacting Act 549, and in
particular section 4, was to avoid subjecting the other heirs to the
possibility of such suits indefinitely in the interest of stability of
land titles.
The legal dilemma created by section 2 of Act 720 is an in-
teresting one, not capable of simple resolution. But, with the excep-
tion of section 2, Act 720 represents a much needed reconsideration
of important Civil Code articles. The provisions of Act 720, in com-
parison to its predecessor, are more consistent with the Civil Code
structure regarding proof of the parent-child relationship and less
suggestive of litigation involving statutory interpretation.
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 919, as interpreted in Succession of Broum, 388 So. 2d 1151
(La. 1980).
53. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1381; LA. R.S. 9:5630 added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 721,
§ 1.
54. 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). See text at note 51, supra.
55. LA. Civ. CODE art. 919. For a discussion of the retroactivity of Succession of
Brown, see Succession of Ross, 397 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), and Note, The
Problematic Application of Succession of Brown, 41 LA. L. REV. 1314 (1981).
56. September 3, 1980, was the date the decision in Succession of Brown was
rendered.
[Vol. 42
